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Abstract 
This article discusses different accounts of Shanghai Modern, the period between 
1920s and 1940s in which the city occupied a unique position within China and 
the world. It places discussions of this period in the context of the resurgence of 
urban led modernization in China, led by Shanghai. It looks in particular at Leo 
Ou-Fan Lee’s attempt to link the cosmopolitanism of Shanghai modern with pro-
spects for this new post-reform China. I then discuss Ackbas Abbas’ response to 
this book and use this as a way of reflecting on the progress of Shanghai urban 
development and its divergence/ convergence with similar processes in the West. 
The article then looks at the other significant moment of the Cultural Revolution 
as a way of opening up discussions of Chinese and Shanghainese modernity be-
yond that of simply an absorption into Western capitalist modernity. It concludes 
by briefly introducing this volume.  
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I 
When Shanghai fell in 1949 to the Chinese communists a door was shut. During the 
cultural revolution the door was bolted for good. A world had gone…[C]ommunism 
has fallen on the city like a sandstorm, burying and preserving…. Communism has 
mummified Shanghai’s appearance in a manner inconceivable to a Westerner. 
Shopping centres, over-passes and subways are all missing. So, despite carefully 
preserved wrappings, is Shanghai’s spirit. … To write about a spiritually dead city 
presents difficulties.  (Sergeant, Shanghai, 1991: 5-6) 
After years of stagnation, the great metropolis of SHANGHAI is undergoing one of 
the fastest economic expansions the world has ever seen. The skyline is filling with 
skyscrapers; there are three thousand now, more than New York, and another two 
thousand are coming soon. Gleaming shopping malls, luxurious hotels and prestig-
ious arts centres are rising alongside. Shanghai's 21 million residents enjoy the 
highest incomes on the mainland, and there's plenty for them to splash out on; wit-
ness the rash of celebrity restaurants and designer flagship stores. In short, it's a 
city with a swagger, bursting with nouveau riche exuberance and élan. (Rough 
Guide on-line 2011) 
On the surface these two quotes stage a fairly straight-forward narrative of a pro-
gression from Communist stagnation, closure to the world, and spiritual death to 
growth, openness and the recovery of exuberance and élan. It is a narrative that 
has set the tone for many western commentators who began to take an increasing 
interest in China generally from the mid-1990s, accelerating rapidly after the turn 
of the millennium. In the 1990s it was South China that drew western attention; in 
Shenzhen and the Pearl River Delta an energetic entrepreneurialism reminiscent 
of early industrial Manchester was transforming the landscape of communist 
state-owned enterprises into a new “workshop of the world”, red in tooth and 
claw. In the post-1989 world this Manchesterismus could only be welcome, and 
much more so than the gangster capitalism that was emerging in the various frag-
ments of the Soviet Union.  
But already for observers on the ground, the transformation was becoming more 
than a return to the capitalist fold. This was not primarily a question of whether 
China’s capitalism was a “real” capitalism, or when (if at all) it would develop 
liberal democratic political forms. It was the speed and scale of its urban trans-
formation that was somehow shocking, even monstrous. Through books such as 
Rem Koolhaas’ The Great Leap Forward – which built on his other Harvard-
Based projects of the later 1990s such as S,M,L,XL – western readers encountered 
not just a re-run of western urban modernisation but some new kind of city-
region, on a scale which urban planners in the west could scarcely conceive. He-
roic modernism, demonised in the West since the early 1970s, had in many ways 
already migrated to Asian cities through the work of “starchitects” Norman Fos-
ter, Rienzo Piano and Richard Rogers (Foster 2010). The radical vision of a re-
vived (or indeed, “retroactive”) modernism articulated by Koolhaas in Delirious 
New York (1974) now seemed more at home in Asia, and especially China, than in 
Manhattan (see Owen Hatherley in this volume).  
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New visitors to China from the late 1990s onwards experienced a first encoun-
ter with a new kind of future. For those who read the numbers properly – and in 
the boom years of the 1990s there were few who could see past the liberal demo-
cratic End of History – it was clear that if China’s growth continued in this way 
then this could not be simply a quirky regional variety of capitalist modernization. 
However its development turned out its sheer mass was going to have profound 
consequences on every global indicator you could care to mention – from eco-
nomic to environmental to geo-political.  
Fukuyama’s now notorious The End of History (1992) proclaimed the ultimate 
triumph of capitalist liberal democracy at the same time as it suggested that the 
future could only be more of the same. It coincided with Frederick Jameson’s 
“postmodern moment”, in which the horizon of global capitalism stretched out in 
all directions, obliterating the idea of a different future and indeed temporality as 
such (Jameson 1991). Commentators constantly invoked Ridley Scott’s film 
Blade Runner to describe the neon-lit skyline of the new Asian cities; but this dys-
topian, futureless urban future, with its synthesized, manipulated individual and 
collective pasts (visible in the retro-noir form itself) is clearly Los Angeles. The 
comparison misses what Chinese cities of the 1990s exuded: an optimistic future 
of growth, technology and general material improvement long since abandoned in 
the West. Visitors encountered a kind of modernization process which our “post-
materialism” had seemingly surpassed and they found a charge of energy and op-
timism – even libido – which could only bring on nostalgia for the West’s earlier 
naïve belief in progress; that the future could only get better.  
Fukuyama’s title refers to Hegel’s lectures on world history in the later 1820s. 
These have been taken as a definitive moment when Asia – despotic, luxurious, 
cruel, vital, vast – was consigned to a pre-modern past. Whereas in the late 18th 
century Great Britain could conceive of Imperial China on equal terms (not recip-
rocated), a decade after Hegel’s lectures a few gun boats brought the archaic em-
pire to heel. Underneath the dominant narrative of China – finally acknowledging 
its communist dead-end and launching a rapid catch-up that must inevitably lead 
to its normalization – another version of this re-run could be discerned. For those 
with eyes to see, the future first encountered in South China was monstrous – and 
intoxicating – not just because of its outsized re-run of naïve promethean modern-
ization; here the future was just beginning and it was no longer necessarily ours. 
Fukiyama’s end of history moment paradoxically marked the definitive passage of 
Hegel’s West into the past.  
II 
Shenzhen, the wunderkind of Chinese modernization, was a village-cum-
workshop-of-the-world. The green light given to Shanghai’s development in 1992 
by Deng Xiaoping irrecoverably changed the dynamics of urban development in 
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China. Shanghai had been an economic powerhouse throughout the Communist 
era but having to donate 80 percent of its income to the national government 
meant its urban infrastructure received very little investment. Hence the state of 
the city described by Hilary Sergeant above as “mummified”. Reviving this 
mummy, as in the Hollywood films, was always going to be an uncertain process. 
The scenario outlined above is one where Shanghai would pick up where it left off 
in the 1930s. The entrepreneurial spirit and economic know-how of the city, its 
connections with oversees Chinese capital, its established – if dilapidated – urban 
infrastructure would, now that it was given its chance, propel the city into the 
forefront of the economic reform process. Which it duly did. Driven forward by 
the municipal leadership – soon to be national – of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 
Shanghai embarked on that rapid process of urban development which stands as 
background to the papers in this volume (Chen 2009).  
“Picking up where it left off” meant something different for a Chinese Com-
munist Party (CPC) leadership engaged in the post-1978 reform process. This 
renewed spurt of modernization could never be the repudiation of the revolution 
to which it was assigned by many western writers. Its initial justification was the 
rejection, not of Communism, but its ultra-left excesses during the Cultural Revo-
lution. It was a picking up of the debates around the role of the market and foreign 
trade during the heroic modernization process of the 1950s and early 1960s – but 
now with the examples of the Asian tigers striding into the distance and in a new, 
unpredictable context of “globalization”. The astonishing development of Pudong 
begun in the mid-1990s, with its cluster of huge skyscrapers in the “Tomorrow 
Square” of Lujiazui, was meant as a surpassing of the colonial buildings on The 
Bund in Puxi. The new Shanghai would no longer be in the shadow of its imperi-
alist capitalist past; the earlier phase of modernization which had built the city 
into “the Paris (or New York) of the East” would be dwarfed by new forces pro-
pelling the shiny metropolis skywards from the rice fields.  
Nevertheless, the emergence of Shanghai at the forefront of this modernization 
opened up some particularly deep and complex fissures in this post-reform narra-
tive. The revival of Shanghai was an acknowledgment of the primary power of 
urban modernization after thirty years of rural-led development. Shanghai had 
been the site of the foundation of the CPC and of the early workers struggles 
against both capitalism and imperialism. After their 1927 suppression in the city 
by Chiang Kai-shek the main Communist forces had moved to the countryside 
and eventually, in Mao’s famous formulation, “surrounded the cities”.  
History has dealt its most ironic coup de grace by making the cities [Hong Kong and 
Shanghai] important once again as cultural and commercial centers after half a cen-
tury of rural revolution promoting the triumph of the countryside over the cities. As 
a century of China’s search for modernity comes to an end, the specters that hang 
over the not too distant horizon are cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong. (Lee 
1999: 339) 
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This was more than a switch of economic policy – though the consequences of 
this were to be profound (and deeply mixed) for both urbanites and rural workers. 
For in the historiography of the People’s Republic Shanghai had not just been 
China’s foremost site of modernization but also of its capitalist and imperialist 
degradation.  The liberation of Shanghai in 1949 was presented by the Com-
munists as a victory not just over a key imperialist foothold but a definitive rebut-
tal of a western capitalist model of modernization and of the urban modernity to 
which it had given rise. Shanghai represented cosmopolitan decadence and exploi-
tation, a city of workers, prostitutes and beggars lorded over by foreign and Chi-
nese comprador capitalists. The victorious arrival of the ragged, peasant Red Ar-
my down the Huai Hai road was an act of repudiation and cleansing. The high 
level of contribution required from Shanghai by the national government was as 
much punitive as it was necessary; the city was to pay for its sins by financing the 
modernisation of the rest of China.  
Did the return of Shanghai signify more than the return of the market and a re-
newed emphasis on urban development? Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were also 
based on an “opening up” which many students and intellectuals wished to extend 
from inward investment and foreign trade to the promise of greater cultural and 
democratic freedoms. The events of June 4th 1989 put an end to this easy assump-
tion at the national level; but did the re-launch of the reforms in 1992 and the re-
emergence of Shanghai signify the resumption of an older urban modernity in 
which this “openness” might thrive anew? 
III 
This seems to me the significance of Leo Ou-Fan Lee’s influential 1999 book 
Shanghai Modern which attempted to establish a connection between the re-
emergence of Shanghai and an older Chinese cosmopolitanism lost in 1949 
(though partially preserved in its mirror-city of Hong Kong). Hong Kong is in 
many ways the lens through which Lee views the emerging Shanghai1 and indeed 
his book comes at the end of a decade in which Shanghai’s past had been subject 
of a concerted effort of remembrance in Hong Kong’s academic and popular cul-
ture alike. In opening up new directions for the future the post-1978 reforms nec-
essarily shifted perspectives on the past; they raised questions of “what if”, of 
paths chosen and paths discarded. Hong Kong (and Taiwan, built on a very differ-
ent form of exodus) was faced with a re-convergence of paths as 1997 drew close. 
This was political convergence (with 2042 in the deep background)2 and also eco-
nomic, as China’s urban commercial-led expansion recalled that of Hong Kong 
(and Taiwan) since the 1950s. Would Shanghai and Hong Kong represent a cul-
tural convergence, the cosmopolitan culture of the former partially preserved by 
the latter, and both returning centre stage in a new reformed China? 
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Lee’s book evokes the cosmopolitan world of Shanghai of the 1920s and 1930s 
which came to an end in the second world war and subsequent civil war. The book 
builds on and extends an international scholarship – much of it North American – 
which attempted to unearth this period from the rubble of capitalist and imperialist 
exploitation under which it had been buried by Communist historiography. In this 
revised image we have a thriving metropolis providing space for a growing Chi-
nese financial and industrial capital and an emergent urban middle class enjoying 
material comforts on a par with its counterparts in other great international cities. 
This ongoing task of Shanghai historical research was an 
archeology of knowledge, a pursuit of a specific type of knowledge acquired 
through systematic description of rich artifacts and archives otherwise buried or 
glossed over by standard sociopolitical histories of modern China. (Zhang 1999:4). 
This historical work continues, with new books on this period appearing all the 
time; but retrieving the image of Shanghai was of more than pure historical inter-
est. Clearly some of this revision of “standard” – that is Communist – “sociopolit-
ical histories” in the 1980s and 1990s followed the pattern set by revisionist ac-
counts of the French and Russian revolutions, in which emergent forces of liberal-
ism and capitalism were brutally cut down before they could fully develop. The 
two quotes at the beginning echo this narrative. But Lee’s evocation of Shanghai 
modernity is much more complex than this.  
Lee rejects the simplistic description of those new spaces of modernity – the 
new buildings, the department stores, the coffee houses, dance halls, public parks, 
race course, not to mention the public cultural space opened up by publishing, 
cinemas, recorded music and so on – as colonial, and those who inhabited them as 
mimicking their western masters. He evokes an “urban cultural sensibility rooted 
in cosmopolitanism” (339), of openness to the world: 
If cosmopolitanism means an abiding curiosity in “looking out” – locating oneself as 
cultural mediator at the intersection between China and other parts of the world – 
then Shanghai in the 1930s was the cosmopolitan city par excellence. (Lee 1999: 
315)  
The city is a cosmopolitan space in which new forms of a distinctly modern Chi-
nese culture emerge from their encounter with Western and Japanese modernity. 
Lee argues strongly not just against the accusation of “mimicry” but also those 
that suggest this cosmopolitanism was superficial and had/ could have little im-
pact against the inertia of traditional culture. Arguing against just such a charac-
terization of the 1930s by Joseph Levenson in 1966, as that writer witnessed the 
wiping out of “whatever traces of cosmopolitanism still remained in Shanghai” 
(313), Lee sees the return of Shanghai in the 1990s as a redemption of the cosmo-
politan promise of Shanghai modern. As we shall see shortly, Ackbar Abbas 
(2000) was to immediately question the  notion of “cosmopolitan”; but I would 
argue that for Lee cosmopolitanism represented not just a particular “urban cul-
tural sensibility” but a space of historical possibility.  
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Lee’s positive evocation of a bygone Shanghai modern certainly related to 
hopes for the future of post-reform China; but its openness to the world, its role as 
“cultural mediator”, suggested more than simply throwing in its lot with western 
modernity – either in the 1930s or now. For Shanghai’s “urban cultural sensibil-
ity” was certainly linked to the material comforts and possibilities brought by 
western technology and trade, but this “material culture” was negotiated via an 
artistic and literary modernism. This modernism, itself an import (usually via Ja-
pan), was a means by which western modernity could be assimilated to Chinese 
traditional culture and used to create a new kind of modern Chinese culture. The 
power of Shanghai modern, as I read it in Lee, lies in its opening up of alternative 
possible modernities between Chinese tradition and colonial imitation. It locates 
modernism in the wider swirl of ideas which erupted in China in the early 20th 
century. This modernism is a situated, provisional urban cultural working through 
of that conundrum outlined in mid-19th century China: “Chinese learning for es-
sence, Western learning for practical use”. Unlike Baudelaire’s Paris, in which 
modernity was cultural catastrophe, Shanghai modernism shared more of the 
1920s avant-garde enthusiasm for the possibilities of modernity. It was not just a 
celebration of Mao Dun’s “Light, Heat, Power” but an attempt to use these new 
possibilities of modernity to renew Chinese culture (Mao 1979).  
This is much more than a problem for historiography or “archeology”. Though 
these tasks are important, and help us, in the word of Andrew Jones (2001) “com-
plicate” standard historical accounts, there is a tendency to construct Shanghai 
modern as a lost antique world in a way akin to Benjamin’s notion of historicism 
– the past “as it really was”. In contrast Benjamin’s practice sought to reconstruct 
the epoch for its contemporary relevance, “in order to blast a specific era out of 
the homogenous course of history” (Benjamin 1969: 263). This was the Jetztzeit 
or “now-time” in which past connects to the present. Lee’s discussion of the 
emergence of popular cultural nostalgia for old Shanghai in the 1980s relates to 
this. Faced with the reversion to mainland China in 1997 Hong Kong – which had 
abandoned itself to money making (very successfully) – became conscious of it-
self in the mirror of a past Shanghai. Shanghai provided a form of historical 
memory in a city which most saw as having abandoned this: 
Nostalgia in this case has gone beyond pastiche and parody to offer a historical alle-
gory: if the past no longer exists – a common metaphor for a place such as Hong 
Kong – it must be reinvented in order to make a new connection with the present. 
(Lee 1999:336) 
Does this “flashing up” of an image of the past also represent “a moment of dan-
ger”? If Hong Kong and Shanghai represent a new space of cosmopolitan open-
ness for the new China might the historical disappearance of Shanghai modern not 
also prefigure that of Hong Kong in 1997? Has Hong Kong woken up only at the 
moment of its disappearance? But what is this image that is being invoked and 
what is at stake in its survival or disappearance.   
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It is surely more than an “urban cultural sensibility”, at least insofar as this is 
reduced to “urbanity”; it was more a space to think through the profound chal-
lenges of China’s encounter with modernity. “Mediation” was not simply transla-
tion but concerned with new directions, new possibilities within a renewed mod-
ern China. These implications have been drawn out by Meng Yue’s Shanghai and 
the Edges of Empires (2006) which attempts to reconstruct a number of different 
projects or moments in which the possibilities for a different kind of Chinese mo-
dernity might emerge from its encounter with the world. These possibilities 
emerged from Shanghai’s position as a liminal site, at the intersection of different 
empires. These projects of culture (a pleasure garden), technology (the arsenal3), 
knowledge (publishing) and commerce (the New World entertainment centre) rep-
resented possibilities for a different Chinese modernity. The return of Shanghai 
modern was surely a re-opening of that space of dialogue about the possibilities of 
modernity in China, a space that had progressively narrowed until the forces of 
empire, war and revolution finally shut it down –subsequently channeling it with-
in post-war Fordist-capitalist and communist modernization. 
However, that cosmopolitan modernity represented by Shanghai’s past and 
(possible) future was also being retrieved more generally in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The western literature on which Lee draws to help uncover Shanghai’s modernity 
testifies to extensive work in cultural history and cultural studies which had ren-
dered the linear narratives of modernization problematic. In Marshall Berman’s 
seminal All That is Solid Melts into Air (1983) technological-industrial moderni-
zation and the socio-cultural forms of modernity to which this gives rise become 
uneasy bedfellows. Berman’s continued commitment to the modern looked back 
to an older modernity than that represented by a “high modernism” which either 
uncritically welcomed or utterly rejected modernization. It was in the messy 
modernism of “the street”, that Berman located the historical existential confron-
tation with both the dangers and possibilities of modernity. These possibilities had 
also been ironed flat by the different technocratic modernisatons of capitalism and 
communism, as had the messy streets by the urban planers and architects who 
served them.  
Perry Anderson’s famous response was to situate the promise of modernism in 
a particular moment before the Second World War which had now definitively 
disappeared (Anderson 1984). But Berman’s intent was to open up the history of 
modernism to a wider material, and above all, urban culture of modernity and re-
trieve its possibilities for a contemporary historical moment.4 As with Koolhaas’ 
search for a more unruly modern urbanism than that of the International School, 
Berman’s evocation of “the street” was part of a wider rejection of the Fordist city 
subject to zoning and functional planning. Indeed, the 1970s saw the beginning of 
that nostalgia for the 19th century city – with its anarchic energies and grotesque 
excesses – before it was tamed by Fordist planning.5 This nostalgia was clearly 
associated with the disappearance of the industrial city and the first stirrings of 
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“culture-led urban regeneration” (Zukin 1982). But this retrieval of “modernism 
in the streets” was also a political one – part of the post-1968 New Left rejection 
of the older communist parties and a re-examination of culture and politics in the 
age of “the cultural is political”. We might see the urban culture unearthed by Lee 
as both pre- and post-Communist, and it is so in a way that evokes a sense of the 
re-opening of possibilities much more exciting than any overdue re-insertion of 
Shanghai into global capitalism. Viewed in this light a return of Shanghai modern 
would present problems for those in the driving seat of the city’s new round of 
modernization.  
IV 
Any archeology of Shanghai modern, concerned to excavate buried pasts and 
complicate the easy narratives of “standard sociopolitical histories”, needs also to 
take cognizance of the hard choices forced on contemporary actors. Decisions 
were made and paths taken which can be reviewed but not belittled by the back-
ward glance of contemporary cultural history and theory. The return of Shanghai 
modern would inevitably problematise the choices made and the roads taken. In 
particular it would re-open the debates on artistic and cultural autonomy of the 
1930s and the codification of the CPC solution by Mao at Yan’an in 1946. Many 
of those educated, battle-hardened cadres who returned with the Red Army in 
1949 were also looking to atone for their indulgences in the urban milieu of 
Shanghai and to justify their subsequent political decisions (Andreas 2009). How-
ever Shanghai might look from the vantage of Hong Kong, for those driving the 
city forward the archeology of the city’s past was inevitably politically charged.  
In the very last pages of his book Lee equates the return of cosmopolitanism 
with the opening up of Shanghai to foreign capital, as exemplified by its interna-
tionally designed architecture. This has: 
spurred a massive research project on Shanghai’s history and culture6…[a]nd a new 
generation of Shanghai writers and poets have begun to explore…what they call a 
new “urban consciousness” (dushi yishi) – a subject of which they had previously 
known practically nothing. A journal called Shanghai Culture (Shanghai Wenhua) 
was launched in 1993 [and] reaffirms the “deep and solid foundation of the school of 
Shanghai culture, with its splendid tradition of assimilating outside culture with an 
open mind”. (340) 
It is against this too easy linkage that Ackbar Abbas responded in Cosmopolitan 
De-scriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong (2000). He questioned the assumption 
that cosmopolitanism is an unproblematic, universal value. Cosmopolitanism was 
quite capable of operating side-by-side with nationalism and imperialism: “for-
eign domination and local appropriation are not necessarily mutually exclusive” 
(775). In Shanghai inequality – “splendour and squalor” – could be pushed to gro-
tesque extremes; and this in turn reminds us that “the cosmopolitan ‘attitude’ in 
this case consists not in the toleration of difference but in the necessary cultivation 
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of indifference” (2000; 775). This is not to deny that in “negotiating the anomalies 
of extraterritoriality… a kind of grace comes out of the grotesque” (786) but it is 
to situate Shanghai in its “non-viable” context. Shanghai had managed to become 
one of the most open cities in the world: 
The other side of this freedom and openness, however, was a certain isolation—a 
linkage to the world that went together with a delinkage from the rest of China. 
There was always something very fragile about Shanghai cosmopolitanism. After 
1949, Chinese communism, born in Shanghai, quickly made Shanghai’s urban cul-
ture no more than a memory. (Abbas 2000: 776) 
This is a crucial point because it places the task of modern nation-building – to 
which Shanghai modern contributed via its creation of a new “imagined commu-
nity” (cf. Lee 1999: 45-50) – in a much more tragic light. Shanghai’s cosmopoli-
tanism had come at a certain cost – its delinkage from the rest of China – and it 
was incapable of effecting that transition to a real national community achieved 
by the Communist mobilization of the peasantry. It makes the easy narratives of 
the “interruption” of an incipient modernity represented by Shanghai much less 
easy to sustain. It also makes the return of Shanghai and its historical memory 
much more problematic.  
Abbas points to the fact that the global space to which Shanghai is now (re-) 
opening up is not a space of “internationalism” but of “globalization”, where the 
nation-state is now constantly bye-passed by global capital flows which move 
freely within and between localities. Abbas uses the term glocalisation, which 
was first used 
to describe the need to adapt  a global outlook to local conditions, a kind of “micro-
marketing”… [and as] encapsulated now in the corporate slogan “think globally, act 
locally,” is a top-down approach to society, however: a hybrid term, it concludes by 
homogenising the hybrid and local. (784) 
The notion of “cultural mediation” is no longer the job of the cosmopolitan open 
to otherness but of capitalism itself through a process of “arbitrage”, where global 
capital finds ways of articulating itself within a series of different localities. The 
easy equation of cosmopolitanism with “openness” is not possible. That indiffer-
ence Abbas saw in an earlier cosmopolitanism is now written into the very space 
of contemporary cities whose insertion into global flows have made them “non-
places”: 
The overcomplex space of non-places means, among other things, that even the 
anomalous  detail may no longer be recognisable as such because it coexists with a 
swarm of other such details. This means the anomalous is in danger of turning non-
descript, in much the same way that the more complex the city today, the more it be-
comes a city without qualities. The cosmopolitan as urban phenomenon is inevitably 
inscribed in such non-places and paradoxes… (772-3) 
How does this phase of rapid urban expansion in an age of globalization leave the 
history of Shanghai Modern? The “massive research project on Shanghai’s history 
and culture” noted by Lee was precisely meant to address this; it would position 
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“its splendid tradition of assimilating outside culture with an open mind” as a cen-
tral resource for becoming a global city. As Wen-Hsin Yeh (2007) describes it,  
Shanghai historians rallied to throw their weight behind the city’s modernization 
project and to make the intellectual case in favor of the outlined change…. [T]he 
historians, through their descriptions of the city’s recent past, embraced Shanghai’s 
modern history as a chronicle of Shanghai’s uniqueness, if not China’s pride. By do-
ing so they set aside an old-fashioned, revolutionary belief and refashioned the city’s 
urban identity. (211) 
Is this the return of Shanghai modern anticipated by Lee? Not quite. Yeh goes on 
to describe the project in terms that would not appear out of step with the revi-
sionist histories of the last thirty years.  
By shifting attention away from colonialism, capitalism, Nationalist betrayal, and 
Communist martyrdom, new images emerged that described a middle class city of 
material comfort in everyday life that was making steady progress in the enhance-
ment of wealth and health…Instead of dwelling upon the structural injustices in the 
“social relations of production” under capitalism, the more innovative historians 
chronicled the scientific and technological advancement in “modes of production”7 
as the city underwent modernization… Pre-1949 Shanghai was the making…neither 
of the colonialists nor the capitalists. It was, instead the work of the petty urbanites 
who were the occupants… of the shikumen residences. In the words of Zhang 
Zhongli, president of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, “The bottom line 
is: Shanghai was Chinese, Shanghai was Shanghainese. The city developed as a re-
sult of the people in Shanghai making innovations on inspirations taken from the 
West”. (211-2) 
This, I would suggest, is not a setting aside of the “old fashioned revolutionary 
belief” per se. It was the discourse of surpassing represented by the Pudong sky-
scrapers overlooking The Bund. It re-positioned the Communist party as able to 
lead a new modernization process in which primary industrialization within the 
context of social equality gave way to a modern market-driven urban consumer 
economy. As most observers noted, this rapid process of urban modernization was 
accompanied by large-scale urban demolition and re-location not seen in the West 
since the 1950s and 1960s. Lee notes the nostalgia for old Shanghai as a phenom-
enon in Shanghai as well as Hong Kong; but in fact much of this was a desperate 
attempt by people to stay in the real houses and real communities that they actual-
ly lived in. Nostalgia, like everything else, had to move pretty sharply in Shanghai 
because the shikumen’s return as memory-image happened at the same time as its 
disappearance in fact. And indeed as its re-appearance as style (Liang 2008; 
O’Connor & Xin Gu 2012). The paradoxes abound; the return of Shanghai is feted 
as a return of an older urban sensibility ironed flat by Communist modernization 
but is subjected to a top-down urban master-planned modernization worthy of 
Robert Moses.  
This was a crucial insight of Abbas. Shanghai’s rapid modernization did not 
remove the past completely – as in classic post-war urbanism – but engaged in 
demolition and preservation at the same time.  
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Preservation in Shanghai is motivated by something quite different from the usual 
pieties about “cultural heritage,” which, given the city’s colonial past, can only be 
ambiguous. It is motivated more by anticipations of a new Shanghai to rival the old 
than simply by nostalgia for the past. In other words, preservation is something more 
complex than just a question of the past remembered: in Shanghai, the past allows 
the present to pursue the future; hence “memory” itself is select and fissured, some-
times indistinguishable from amnesia. This paradox of the past as the future’s future 
also throws a particular light on Shanghai’s urban development, which, like preser-
vation, takes on a special quality: Shanghai today is not just a city on the make with 
the new and brash everywhere—as might be said more aptly of Shenzhen, for exam-
ple. It is also something more subtle and historically elusive: the city as remake , a 
shot-by-shot reworking of a classic, with the latest technology, a different cast, and a 
new audience. Not “Back to the Future” but “Forward to the Past”. (780) 
Shanghai historians might provide the basis for a re-interpretation of the city’s 
ambiguous colonial past in the light of present exigencies; many of the papers in 
this issue, Ma Ran and Lu Pan in particular, attest to some of the elisions and 
omissions in this process. But the past was also being mobilised as global image 
capital: 
Invoking a continuity with a legendary past—no matter how ambiguous that past 
may have been—enhances the city’s attractiveness, gives it historical cachet, and 
hence equips it to compete for foreign investment and the tourist trade on more fa-
vourable terms. The past is a kind of symbolic capital. At the same time, preserva-
tion often accompanies the revitalization and gentrification of decaying areas of the 
city and contributes to urban renewal. (781) 
What “past” underlies this “symbolic capital”? To a certain extent it is a ready-
made image of that exotic “divine decadence” associated with Shanghai in the 
popular imagination of the West, readily promoted in travel magazines and fash-
ion supplements. It is also, as we have suggested, used as an index of progress – 
this is what we have now absorbed and surpassed. But Abbas’ reference to its role 
in “urban renewal” points also to something else. The messy modernity of “the 
streets”, the pre-modernised, pre-Fordist city, key to the allure of Shanghai in both 
academic and popular references, is not being by-passed in Shanghai but adapted 
as it had become from the West. The possibilities evoked by Marshall Berman 
and grasped by a new generation of urban cultural policy thinkers and activists 
had, from the 1990s, become compromised by their association with city booster-
ism and real estate development. Indeed, the retrieval of modernism’s wider con-
nection with the material culture of urban modernity which Berman had helped 
inspire, had very easily drifted into a celebration of urban consumer cultures as an 
index of modernity on a par with that of technological modernization.  
The “cultural intermediaries” identified by Sharon Zukin (1982), recreating a 
bohemian-artistic zone in the heart of Manhattan, were quickly replaced by the 
cultural “arbitrage” of a new kind of real estate development in which historical 
patina and neo-bohemian “cool” worked together. The “creative clusters” dis-
cussed by Sheng Zhong and Gu Xin in this issue were the result less of top-down 
planning (though they became that too) than incremental learning via a range of 
architects, artists, gallery owners, cultural policy agencies, Hong Kong and Tai-
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wanese developers, academic “gurus” and so on in association with an emerging 
local and foreign clientele (cf. Ren 2011). A process of “mediation” or “arbitrage” 
at the micro level represented the day-to-day algorithms of a Shanghai culture-led 
urban regeneration which rapidly traversed that arc which had run between Jane 
Jacob’s sixties paean to a “mixed-use” street-level neighborhood urbanism (1961) 
and the glitzy hang-outs of Richard Florida’s creative class (2002).  
V 
For Wen-Hsin Yeh writing in 2007:  
the past…has ceased to have much relevance in Shanghai’s relentless drive to climb 
the heights of material transformation in its embrace of the world. The city, thanks 
to the Shanghai historians, had liberated itself from the long-established master nar-
rative of socialism against capitalism, and nationalism against colonialism. It had ar-
rived happily at an almost “weightless” state free of the burden of its past. There 
were no more denunciations against the evils of capitalism or colonialism. Instead, 
what was materially beneficial for Shanghai had to be ethically good and historically 
right. (216) 
The Shanghai authorities have “set aside” the discursive framework established 
since the Opium War and are “shedding the weight of history” (217). In this 
weightless state individual histories are allowed to float free, and vie with each 
other for “a place in urban memories”. Memories are simply an aspect of each 
individual’s identity with no connection to any historical narrative.  
But how do we know if we have reached an epochal moment in Shanghai’s – or 
China’s – history if so much of what we hear, said or unsaid, seems reminiscent, in 
bits and pieces at least, of century-old descriptions.  
Another irony: in this account the return of the possibilities contained in Lee’s 
Shanghai modern turned out to be their dissolution into individual reminiscences 
with no wider historical traction. Indeed, we are back with Jameson’s end of tem-
porality, the absence of any grand narrative other than that of capitalism expand-
ing in space towards the horizon.   
This seems to me to underplay the sense of history still claimed by the CPC and 
indeed its sensitivity to the fissures and ambiguities of its “innovative” re-writing 
of Shanghai’s past – as we see throughout this issue. The “opening up” which 
many saw heralded by the return of Shanghai modern was highly partial; it was a 
retrieval of an urban heroic modernization – Manhattanism – without any of the 
open ambiguities of the modernity which went with this. Or rather, the ambigui-
ties returned as style. It was a narrowing down or hollowing out of the promises of 
an older urban modernity into new forms of lifestyle consumption. The individua-
tion of memories is not (only) the result of the weightlessness of postmodern his-
tory but the concomitant exclusion of any form of social input into the plans taken 
and decisions made by the city on behalf of its citizens. 
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But the “heroic modernization” of urban China – and its “trickle-down” eco-
nomics of which Shanghai is emblematic – is a precarious balancing trick. Not 
only does it hope that those who “got rich first”, in Deng Xiaoping’s famous for-
mulation (cf. Hewitt 2010), find ways of passing it down, but that the big Eastern 
cities find a way of passing it on to the interior. Neither of these appear to be hap-
pening, and in this context, with the growing unrest in town and country alike, 
history appears to be gaining weight again.  
It took Mao Zedong’s genius to see, against the grain of orthodox Marxism, that 
even rural spaces, at least in the historical situation of China, had a crucial role to 
play in modern and national life. This was the insight that allowed Mao to displace 
cities in general from their role as the sole exclusive site of modernity—and Shang-
hai in particular from its claim to be China’s preeminent city. After 1949, the city 
could no longer enjoy the privilege of being a law unto itself: it was clearly the na-
tion that now held sway over the city. (Abbas 2000: 776) 
Once again the lines of historical fissure appear not just within the city but be-
tween it and rural China. If Shanghai has a “messy modernity” it is to be found in 
the spaces created by the city’s vast social inequalities and the difficulties faced 
by the authorities in sweeping the losers under the carpets of its Prada shops (cf. 
Anna Greenspan in this issue). Shanghai, like the other big cities, depends on rural 
China for the reproduction of the migrant, unregistered (because they are not al-
lowed to be) workforce for which it refuses any social benefits (Lee 2007). These 
grotesqueries suggest a return of a messy modernity which no-one desired and 
which register Shanghai with Mike Davis’ “Planet of Slums” (2006) as much as 
the municipal council’s “City of Culture”. Shanghai itself has its fissures that few 
writing in the Shanghai modern mode have adequately registered. It is a city that 
has not just been woken up, de-mummified and thrust into the global image mael-
strom as the opening quotes imply; it is a de-industrialised city with as strong a 
sense of its collective industrial past as of its cosmopolitan openness. The “city of 
finance and culture” did not step into the vacant spaces left by older industries as 
in the West; it shoved them aside (see Xin Gu in this issue). As the monumental 
documentary West of the Tracks (Dir. Wang Bing, 2003) testifies, this has pro-
duced a powerful sense of loss throughout the great industrial (or “rustbelt”) cen-
tre of China.  
In this context history is not weightless but clearly at the heart of the contesta-
tion between rich and poor, powerful and powerless which is occurring in China – 
as elsewhere across the globe. Claims that the return of Shanghai to its leading 
role represent a return to the path of normal, Western modernity are thus some-
what double edged – for Western modernity is no longer what it was.  
After a meticulous historical reconstruction of the Cultural Revolution – Mao’s 
Last Revolution (2006) – in which their narrative voice remains firmly in the 
background, Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals allow themselves a 
highly charged conclusion. The attempt “to modernize whilst preserving their 
integrity as a people and a culture” (2006: 459) which had pre-occupied China 
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since the Opium War had floundered with the dissolution of Confucianism as 
Chinese “essence”. The CCP replaced this with Marxism-Leninism; tired of aping 
foreigners (the Soviets) the Cultural Revolution “was [Mao’s] last best effort to 
define and perpetuate a distinct Chinese essence in the modern world” (460). Its 
failures 
led Deng to abandon this vain search for a Chinese version of modernity that had 
preoccupied the nation’s politicians and intellectuals for well over a century. China 
had to jump on the bandwagon of successful Western-style modernization that had 
proved so effective in Taiwan and elsewhere in east Asia. The Cultural Revolution 
became the economic and social watershed of modern Chinese history. (2006: 460) 
History has fallen to earth again with a clang! Not just Communism but a distinct 
Chinese modernity is ruled as always impossible, and the whole century-long de-
tour to Western modernization (that is, capitalism) has merely been a tale of 
“sound and fury”. Lee’s Shanghai modern, other than a premonition of China ful-
ly embracing Western modernization, disappears in smoke. In fact Macfarquhar 
and Schoenhals’ assertions alert us to fact that Shanghai modern floated to the 
surface of historical consciousness at the same time that the Cultural Revolution, 
and the debates it had stirred up, was consigned to the outer darkness. Both “con-
servatives” and “liberals” both agree on this. That Shanghai was the capital of this 
Cultural Revolution is something that is buried deep, invisible other than the point 
zero from which the new Shanghai arose (Perry & Li 1997; Owen Hatherley in 
this issue).  
The Cultural Revolution certainly undermined the legitimacy of the CPC, as 
Macfarquhar and Schoenhals argue, but did it undermine the legitimacy of the 
1949 Revolution? What makes the Cultural Revolution so sensitive is not just the 
revelation of past excesses which the CPC is keen to move beyond, making good 
by its delivery of economic growth. The burial of the Cultural Revolution is used 
as proxy to bury those debates about class divisions and common ownership 
which neither the “conservatives” nor the “liberals” are keen to address. It side-
steps another, active “nostalgia” for that common collective effort involved in 
building a revolutionary Chinese nation which many now see as undergoing sys-
tematic and massive privatization. The skyscrapers of Shanghai might elicit the 
pride of some citizens; they certainly do not elicit the same identification as with 
the collective building of China’s industrial base. 
Mao’s Last Revolution does not engage at all with the ideas being fought over 
in the Cultural Revolution – the actors are mere puppets in Mao’s political ma-
neuverings. We might point to two areas where this summary dismissal simply 
will not work. First, there has long been recognition of the importance of Mao’s 
collectivization and rural industrialization for subsequent future growth (Spence 
1999; Naughton 2007). A key area of debate is the emergence of the Town and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the late 1970s and the way such “rural entrepre-
neurialism” fed into the reform process (cf. White 1998; Huang 2008; Andreas 
2010). The point here is that the narratives of reform by conservatives and liberals 
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– agreeing on the benign nature of market-led reform but differing over the role of 
liberal democracy in this process – both present it as a break from the past. In fact 
something much more complex was occurring which concerned not just the roles 
of state and market but the specific nature of the state and the kind of market it 
was creating. Recent questions around the easy narrative of “market reforms” 
raised by Yasheng Huang (2008; and see Anna Greenspan in this issue) and the 
response by Joel Andreas (2010) raise exactly these questions from different polit-
ical perspectives.  
Second, Joel Andreas’ work (2009) on the revolution and education (“better 
Red than Expert”) since 1949 raises serious issues about the post-reform dismissal 
of the Cultural Revolution and its educational policies. Burying these debates 
about the relation between education and social class as so obviously beyond the 
pale is closely related to the rapid acceleration of social inequality in China and 
the solidification of a new kind of ruling elite reproduced (in part) through the 
restored university system.  
Both of these debates chime with the attempt by the Chinese “new left” to find 
alternative accounts of the post-reform period in which new forms of state and 
collective ownership, markets, private enterprise and democratic accountability 
can be found. That is, a rejection of the neo-liberal model in both its western and 
Chinese versions (cf. Wang 2003). Indeed, my one caveat with Abbas’ account is 
his portrait of the state as somehow redundant in this new world of global capital-
ism, other than its management of the past as image capital. In fact, it is become 
clear just how deeply constitutive the Chinese state has been of the capitalism it 
set in motion and continues to manage. Indeed, previously wary of exposing its 
managerialism in the high days of neo-liberalism before 2008, it has since made 
its power to firmly manage the economy a key source of differentiation between it 
and a West in deep economic trouble.  
Debates in China about the role of the state still contain within them strong el-
ements of the collective nation-building and social equity that gave rise to the 
1949 revolution. Indeed, the heroic modernization still present in the cities of ur-
ban China – to which Hatherley in this issue attests – does gain a residual charge 
from that historic task assumed by the CPC. In these circumstances there is no 
reason to suggest that the weight of history has vanished in the smoke of econom-
ic growth. Not only are the social tensions clearly in evidence in China – with the 
legacy of the 1949 revolution still in play around demands for collective justice, 
however attenuated – but China is now rubbing against very different “edges of 
Empire” than those of Shanghai modern. China itself, as the world’s second larg-
est economy, sits at the table of the global hegemons, but as Abbas’ presciently 
showed, the world of global modernity takes us beyond the age of nationalism 
into that of “empire” (Hardt & Negri 2002).  
I certainly do not want here to resurrect some other myth of the Cultural Revo-
lution to set against that of Shanghai modern. These two have been set against 
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each other as cosmopolitanism versus inwardness, but this opposition has hidden 
another less visible one: between ideals of collective consumption and social equi-
ty  and the pleasures and freedoms of urban modernity. But the promises of 
Shanghai modern have been hollowed out by their incarnation in the glittery con-
sumption of Shanghai, just as have the many of the social gains of the revolution. 
If there is some impasse in contemporary Chinese history it is that between the 
conservatives clamping down on democratic cultural expression and the liberals 
who see this as only possible in a free market.  
Unlike Macfarquhar and Schoenhals the distinguished historian of China Mark 
Elwin suggests that the problems of Chinese modernity – raised in the 1870s, 
1880s and 1890s, when Confucianism died as an intellectual force – are still very 
much with us.   
People can and do refer to “the” Chinese revolutions of 1911 and 1949, meaning in 
the main particular sequences of twentieth-century military and political events, and 
this is acceptable as shorthand. But perhaps the most effective way to acquire a feel-
ing for these life-changing processes as a whole is to begin, not with the political on 
its own, or political events over a relatively brief space of time, but with the deeper 
changes in the imagined but emotionally powerful stories in terms of which people 
understand their lives, as a long-term phenomenon. (Elwin 2011: 83) 
Elwin returns us to some key themes set out in that period which have remained 
with China since: 
This debate did not of course end in a single agreed programme; but it did identify a 
set of problems for China, relating to what we loosely call political, economic and 
social “modernity”, which permanently altered the underlying nature of policy de-
bate in China… The radical conceptual and cultural realignment associated with the 
1870s, 1880s and 1890s has, in contrast [to 1911 and 1949], much more of the char-
acter of something that was all but inevitable and irreversible. (101) 
Of course if, like Macfarquhar and Schoenhals, we collapse modernity into west-
ern modernity and both into western capitalist modernity – and they are not alone 
(Hutton 2007; Fergusson 2011) – then there is never going to be much wriggle 
room. But Elwin connects us here with the modernity evoked by Lee in Shanghai 
modern: how to deal with western modernity and to make it their own not at the 
level of imported institutions (though they have a place) but in the “stories in 
terms of which people understand their lives”. This surely is the “urban cultural 
sensibility” Lee looked to in Shanghai modern but which in many respects be-
came the mere image capital for a global skyline. Abbas, at the end of his article, 
asks what a contemporary cosmopolitan can be today: 
The cosmopolitan today will have to include at least some of the less privileged men 
and women placed or displaced in the transnational space of the city and who are 
trying to make sense of its spatial and temporal contradictions: the cosmopolitan not 
as a universalist arbiter of value, but as an arbitrageur/arbitrageuse.[] This is arbi-
trage with a difference. It does not mean the use of technologies to maximise profits 
in a global world but refers to everyday strategies for negotiating the disequilibria 
and dislocations that globalism has created [and].... to the larger historical lessons 
that can be drawn from our experiences of the city. (Abbas 2000: 786) 
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Uncoupling Chinese modernity from both Western and capitalist modernity might 
find a way to engage with a new heroic modernity – a frank acknowledgement of 
the challenges that face us and the means required to achieve this –  in which col-
lective action and provision is charged with the same libido as the individualised 
desires of consumption. This seems to lie behind some of the more recent attempts 
to retrieve modernism in the West (cf. Hatherley 2009), and it chimes with that of 
Berman and Koolhaus in the 1980s. It will mean a break with the nostalgic evoca-
tion of Shanghai modern as a lost world and a retrieval of the emergency situation 
in which an urban cultural sensibility was being carved out of a fragile, explosive 
political context. Because surely that is what we are faced with now? 
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Notes 
1  Frequently this is also via the writer Eileen Chang’s exiled view of Shanghai from Hong 
Kong, though she later took up permanent exile in Los Angeles.  
2  2042 was when the Special Autonomous Region of Honk Kong would revert back to the 
mainland political system. It was also the title of a film by Wong Kar-wai . 
3  An archeological site recently obliterated by the Expo. On this mix of preservation and de-
struction of the past see Abbas (2000) and the papers by Lü Pan and Ma Ran in this issue. 
4  In this it set a pattern for much subsequent work on the history of modernism; indeed it was 
Lee’s opening chapters, in which he contextualized the modernist writers which made up the 
core of the book, which were most influential. 
5  I might highlight in particular the seminar work by Jonathon Raban (1974) Soft City. 
6  Lee acknowledges at this point that his book was written with financial support from this 
Shanghai Academy of Social Science research programme. 
7  The quotations around these concepts are quite telling – clearly indicating that the author 
things they are merely lip service to a now out-dated Marxism. In fact “mode of production” 
should be “forces of production’.  
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